The Hormuz Paradox: Why Iran's ultimate weapon is a threat it cannot afford to use

Hello,


Here is my new paper on the new Israel-Iran conflict:

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# **The Hormuz Paradox: Why Iran's Ultimate Weapon is a Threat It Cannot Afford to Use**

## **Abstract**

This paper argues that despite possessing the military capability to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz, Iran is strategically deterred from implementing a full-scale blockade. Through an analysis of economic, military, and diplomatic factors, this paper contends that Tehran's strategic calculus overwhelmingly favors the *threat* of closure as a tool of geopolitical leverage, rather than the act itself. A full blockade would trigger unacceptable economic self-harm, invite overwhelming military retaliation, and alienate critical international partners. Consequently, Iran’s strategy is—and will likely remain—one of calculated ambiguity and managed disruption, not a suicidal closure of this vital global artery.

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### **1. Introduction**

The Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most critical maritime chokepoint, remains a perennial flashpoint in the escalating shadow war between Iran and Israel. As tensions rise, so does rhetoric from Tehran threatening to "close" the strait, a move that would send shockwaves through the global economy. However, a deeper analysis reveals a fundamental paradox: the very act of deploying Iran's most powerful conventional threat would undermine its own strategic objectives and national survival.

This paper examines the strategic calculus that restrains Iran. It argues that the threat of a blockade is far more valuable to Tehran as a political instrument than its actual implementation would be. By exploring the severe economic, military, and diplomatic consequences of a full closure, we can understand why Iran consistently stops short of this red line, preferring instead a doctrine of asymmetric harassment to achieve its goals.

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### **2. The Strait of Hormuz: A Global Economic Artery**

The strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz cannot be overstated. It is the conduit for approximately 21 million barrels of oil per day—about 21% of global petroleum liquids consumption—and a significant portion of the world's liquefied natural gas (LNG) [[1]](#1). With shipping lanes narrowing to just two miles wide in either direction, the strait is uniquely vulnerable to disruption. Any sustained closure would trigger a global energy crisis, cause oil prices to skyrocket, and severely damage the world economy. It is this immense disruptive potential that gives Iran its leverage.

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### **3. Iran's Strategic Calculus: A Cost-Benefit Analysis**

While Iran has the means to temporarily disrupt the strait using mines, anti-ship missiles, and fast-attack craft, a sober assessment reveals that the costs of such an action would far outweigh any potential benefits.

#### **3.1 The Certainty of Economic Self-Sabotage**

A blockade of Hormuz would be an act of profound economic self-destruction. Iran’s own economy is critically dependent on seaborne exports of crude oil, its primary source of state revenue. Even under heavy sanctions, Iran exports over 1.5 million barrels per day, the vast majority of which must pass through the very strait it threatens to close [[2]](#2). Shutting down Hormuz would instantly sever this economic lifeline, crippling its already fragile economy and potentially stirring domestic unrest. Tehran cannot afford to destroy the foundation of its own fiscal survival.

#### **3.2 The Inevitability of Military Retaliation**

An attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz would be considered a *casus belli* by the United States and its allies. The U.S. Fifth Fleet, based in Bahrain, is tasked specifically with ensuring freedom of navigation in the region. A blockade would trigger a swift and overwhelming military response, including minesweeping operations, airstrikes on Iranian naval assets and coastal missile batteries, and a broader campaign to neutralize Iran's offensive capabilities [[3]](#3). Iran’s military, while formidable in an asymmetric context, cannot win a conventional war against a U.S.-led coalition. This military imbalance serves as the ultimate deterrent.

#### **3.3 The Diplomatic Fallout: Alienating a Critical Lifeline**

Beyond the military and economic spheres, a blockade would be a diplomatic catastrophe for Iran. Its most important international partner, China, is the world's largest oil importer and has a vested interest in maritime stability and predictable energy prices. An Iranian-instigated energy crisis would directly harm Chinese interests, forcing Beijing to distance itself from Tehran and potentially even support international action to reopen the strait [[4]](#4). This would shatter the diplomatic shield that China provides Iran at forums like the UN Security Council, leaving the regime dangerously isolated.

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### **4. The Doctrine of Asymmetric Leverage: From Blockade to Harassment**

Given the prohibitive costs of a full blockade, Iran has refined a more nuanced strategy rooted in asymmetric warfare. Instead of a full closure, Iran pursues a policy of **managed disruption**. The goal is not to stop the flow of oil, but to demonstrate capability, create uncertainty, and raise the costs of doing business for its adversaries.

This doctrine includes tactics such as:
* **Seizing foreign-flagged tankers** on spurious legal grounds.
* **Conducting "swarm" attacks** with fast boats to harass naval and commercial vessels.
* **Employing proxy forces**, such as the Houthis in Yemen, to attack shipping lanes elsewhere (e.g., the Bab el-Mandeb Strait), creating deniability while still applying pressure [[5]](#5).
* **Wielding constant verbal threats** to keep markets on edge and maintain geopolitical relevance.

These actions allow Iran to exert influence and retaliate against its foes without crossing the threshold that would trigger a full-scale war.

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### **5. Historical Precedent and Market Resilience**

History validates this analysis. Iran has threatened to close the strait numerous times, notably during the 2011-12 and 2019 standoffs, but has never followed through [[6]](#6). Each time, the threats were met with firm international resolve, including large-scale naval exercises like the International Mine Countermeasures Exercise (IMCMEX).

Financial markets, while volatile, have learned to price in this "Hormuz risk premium." Furthermore, regional rivals like Saudi Arabia and the UAE have built bypass pipelines that can carry millions of barrels of oil to ports outside the Persian Gulf, providing a partial buffer against disruption [[7]](#7).

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### **6. Conclusion**

The threat to close the Strait of Hormuz is the centerpiece of Iran’s strategic playbook—a powerful tool of coercion precisely because it remains unused. A full blockade is not a credible strategy for Iran but a suicide pact. The crippling economic self-harm, the certainty of a devastating military response, and the alienation of its most crucial ally, China, create a powerful convergence of disincentives.

Iran will continue to leverage the *fear* of a blockade, punctuating its rhetoric with limited acts of asymmetric harassment. For policymakers and market analysts, the key is to distinguish the posture from the probability. While the region will remain a tinderbox, Iran’s actions at Hormuz are likely to remain firmly in the realm of strategic messaging, not strategic suicide.

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### **7. Policy Implications and Recommendations**

* **For Defense Planners:** Maintain a robust and visible naval presence in the Gulf. The U.S. Fifth Fleet and international maritime coalitions are the most effective deterrents against Iranian miscalculation.
* **For Diplomats:** Keep channels of de-escalation open, particularly through neutral intermediaries like Oman and Switzerland. Reducing underlying tensions is the only long-term solution to mitigating the threat.
* **For Energy Markets:** While preparing for short-term price volatility caused by harassment tactics, market actors should assess the probability of a full, sustained blockade as very low. Encouraging the diversification of supply routes and building strategic reserves remains a prudent course of action.

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### **References**

<a id="1">[1]</a> U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). (2023). *The Strait of Hormuz is the world's most important oil chokepoint*. Retrieved from [https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61002

<a id="2">[2]</a> Di-Paola, C., & Varley, S. (2023, December 5). *Iran’s Oil Exports Exceed 1.4 Million Barrels per Day*. Bloomberg. Retrieved from [https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-08-13/iran-oil-exports-exceed-1-4-million-barrels-per-day-mehr]

<a id="3">[3]</a> Congressional Research Service. (2023). *Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies*. Retrieved from [https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R44017]

<a id="4">[4]</a> Fulton, J. (2023). *China's Changing Approach to the Middle East*. Atlantic Council. Retrieved from [https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/chinas-changing-approach-to-the-middle-east/]

<a id="5">[5]</a> Lister, T. (2024, January 12). *Who are the Houthis and why are they attacking ships in the Red Sea?*. CNN. Retrieved from [https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/19/middleeast/red-sea-crisis-explainer-houthi-yemen-israel-intl]

<a id="6">[6]</a> Knights, M. (2019). *The Real Risk in the Strait of Hormuz Is Miscalculation*. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Retrieved from [https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/real-risk-strait-hormuz-miscalculation]

<a id="7">[7]</a> Ghaddar, A. (2024, May 14). *Explainer: What are the Middle East's oil transit chokepoints?*. Reuters. Retrieved from [https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/what-are-middle-easts-oil-transit-chokepoints-2024-02-02/]


And here is what the AI (Artificial intelligence) from Google that is called Gemini 2.5 Pro , that is advanced , answered me about my above new paper:

"This is a very well-structured and cogently argued paper. Your central thesis – that the *threat* of closing the Strait of Hormuz is a far more potent and sustainable weapon for Iran than its actual closure – is compelling and well-supported by your analysis.

Here's a breakdown of what I think works well and a few potential areas for further thought:

**Strengths of Your Paper:**

1. **Clear and Strong Thesis:** The "Hormuz Paradox" is an excellent framing. You state your argument clearly in the abstract and introduction and consistently support it throughout.
2. **Logical Structure:** The paper flows very well, from establishing the strait's importance, to Iran's cost-benefit analysis, to its alternative strategies, historical context, and finally, policy implications.
3. **Comprehensive Analysis of Deterrents:** You effectively cover the three main pillars dissuading Iran:
* **Economic Self-Sabotage:** This is a crucial and often primary deterrent.
* **Military Retaliation:** The inevitability and overwhelming nature of a US-led response are well-articulated.
* **Diplomatic Alienation (especially China):** This is a very important and often under-emphasized point. Highlighting China's pragmatic interest in stability is key.
4. **Nuanced Understanding of Iranian Strategy:** Your distinction between a "full blockade" and "managed disruption" (asymmetric leverage) is spot on. This accurately reflects Iran's actual behavior and capabilities.
5. **Use of Evidence:** The references cited appear appropriate and support your claims (e.g., EIA data, CRS reports, analysis from think tanks and news sources).
6. **Relevant Policy Implications:** The recommendations for defense planners, diplomats, and energy markets are practical and flow directly from your analysis.
7. **Conciseness and Clarity:** The paper is written in clear, accessible academic language. It gets straight to the point without unnecessary jargon.

**Potential Areas for Minor Elaboration or Consideration (if you were to expand):**

1. **The "New" Israel-Iran Conflict Aspect:** Your paper focuses on the general strategic calculus regarding Hormuz. While you mention the "escalating shadow war between Iran and Israel" in the introduction, the body of the paper doesn't explicitly tie the Hormuz threat *specifically* to the *current dynamics* of the Israel-Iran conflict (e.g., post-Oct 7th, direct strikes between Iran and Israel).
* *Consider:* Is the Hormuz threat being brandished differently or with more/less credibility *because* of the recent direct confrontations with Israel? Or is it more of a standing threat primarily aimed at the US and global economy as a deterrent against broader Western pressure/action? Your paper largely argues the latter, which is valid, but the "new Israel-Iran conflict" framing in your introductory email might imply a more direct linkage.
2. **Internal Iranian Dynamics:** You touch upon "domestic unrest." Could this be briefly expanded? How much does the Iranian regime factor in the potential for popular backlash (due to economic collapse) into their Hormuz calculus?
3. **The Miscalculation Factor:** Your paper rightly argues Iran's *rational* calculus. However, conflict is often rife with miscalculation. Is there a scenario where, despite the overwhelming costs, a cornered or desperate Iran might still attempt a partial or full closure? Knights' piece (your ref [6]) on miscalculation is relevant here. Perhaps a brief nod to this risk, even if deemed low.
4. **Defining "Closure":** You focus on a "full-scale blockade." It might be worth briefly acknowledging that even limited, short-term disruptions (e.g., mining a small section, a significant attack on a supertanker that doesn't fully close but spooks markets) could be part of the "managed disruption" toolkit, falling short of a full closure but still having severe consequences. Your paper largely covers this under "harassment," which is fine.


**Overall:**

This is a solid, insightful piece of analysis. It presents a widely accepted strategic argument with clarity, strong supporting points, and relevant evidence. The "Hormuz Paradox" is an effective way to encapsulate the core tension. It would be a valuable read for anyone seeking to understand Iran's strategic options and limitations in the Persian Gulf.

Congratulations on a well-written paper, Amine!"

 

Thank you,
Amine Moulay Ramdane.